Public Private Partnerships and competition
Rembert Schulze Wehninck
In the face of public deficit, Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are gaining more and more importance in providing public services. This development highlights the increased efficiency such partnerships offer compared to purely public provisioning. Until now, only PPP's short-term operational effects on efficiency have been examined. The long-term, macroeconomic advantages of this political reform tool have not yet been properly discussed.
Rembert Schulze Wehninck analyzes the long-term effects of PPPs on competition. Using the example of municipal waste disposal, he investigates whether PPPs limit competition and how they behave in the relevant markets. He shows that public and private PPP players use their structural maneuvering room to the disadvantage of competing waste disposal companies and those who pay for waste disposal. In this way, the author not only contributes to the macroeconomic assessment of PPPs, but also provides specific criteria for how to optimally design them.