By Pedro Guimaraes

For nearly five decades, Brazil has grown at a fraction of its economic potential. A country of extraordinary natural assets, demographic scale, and demonstrated innovation capacity has averaged less than 1% annual GDP growth over the past decade – well below the global average and far below the trajectories of economies that have successfully transitioned from developing to developed status. This study, developed jointly by Roland Berger Brazil and the Roland Berger Institute, asks a direct question: what would it take for Brazil to grow at 4.0% per year through 2050, and what would that mean for the country and its people?

Two futures: the choice Brazil faces

The divergence between Brazil's base case and aspirational scenario is stark. Under the base case – a continuation of current policy conditions and historical performance – Brazil's economy would reach approximately USD 3.3 trillion by 2050, with GDP per capita of around USD 15,000. This would place Brazil roughly on par with today's Chile or Mexico: a middle-income economy that has not closed the gap with the developed world.

The aspirational case projects GDP growth of 4.0% per year, bringing real GDP above USD 6 trillion by 2050 and GDP per capita to approximately USD 28,000 – comparable to today's Portugal or Greece. Under this scenario, Brazil would rise from its current 11th place to the 5th largest economy globally, surpassing Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Indonesia. Critically, this aspiration is not unprecedented: it reflects performance levels Brazil has achieved before, and it is consistent with the trajectories of countries that completed the transition from developing to developed status within 25 to 30 years.

The productivity agenda: five structural levers

Achieving 4.0% annual growth requires approximately 4.0% annual productivity growth – a demanding but reachable target. Our analysis identifies five fundamental productivity levers where Brazil is underperforming relative to both its income-level peers and its own structural potential.

Capital deepening. Brazil's capital stock per worker is significantly below that of economies at the income levels associated with the aspirational scenario. Raising the aggregate investment rate to approximately 23% of GDP – a level Brazil has reached before – would be required to close this gap. A key enabler is a credible fiscal trajectory that brings down the cost of capital and restores access to long-term financing, which remains virtually non-existent in Brazil today.

Regulatory quality. Brazil currently ranks 117th out of 193 countries in global regulatory quality. The cost of poor regulation is tangible: import duties on nearly 30% of product categories exceed 15%, and barriers to competition persist across sectors. Yet Brazil has demonstrated, through its own experience, what better regulation can achieve. The New Sanitation Law of 2020 triggered a 10–15x increase in private investment within five years. The Pix payment system brought tens of millions of previously unbanked citizens into the formal financial system virtually overnight. These are not isolated examples – they are proof of concept.

Government effectiveness. Infrastructure project paralysis, customs clearance inefficiency, and judiciary costs running at 1.3% of GDP – versus an EU average of 0.3% – all act as persistent drags on private sector productivity. Again, Brazil's own track record offers a counter-narrative: the gov.br digital services platform now serves nearly 170 million users with over 4,000 public services, and patent pendency was reduced from eight to three years between 2016 and 2024 through straightforward process improvements.

Reducing labor informality. Informal workers operate at approximately 25% of the productivity level of formal workers, yet informal firms survive by avoiding regulatory costs – artificially displacing more productive, law-abiding competitors. Brazil has made notable progress: the informality rate fell from approximately 60% in 1981 to 38% by 2025, driven by programs such as the MEI individual microentrepreneur scheme and the rollout of electronic invoicing. Yet a further 10 percentage point reduction is required under the aspirational scenario – a target that, based on available research, would increase aggregate labor productivity by approximately 10.5% over 25 years.

Education quality. Brazil's progress on educational access over the past five decades has been genuine: illiteracy fell from 30% to 5%, and college graduates increased more than tenfold. The challenge now lies in quality. PISA scores have remained virtually stagnant since the early 2000s – yet the evidence that rapid improvement is achievable comes from within Brazil itself. Ceará, one of the country's poorest states, achieved the second-highest educational development scores nationally in 2023, surpassing states with two to three times its GDP per capita. Excellence in education is a function of institutional commitment and management practice – not wealth. Our analysis of all five levers consistently leads to the same conclusion: there are no structural impediments preventing Brazil from choosing to implement better conditions for productivity growth.

Global megatrends and Brazil's structural position

Structural reform alone does not account for the full aspirational scenario. Four global megatrends, drawn from the Roland Berger Institute's proprietary Trend Compendium 2050 , create additional and substantial tailwinds for the Brazilian economy through 2050.

Rising global food demand will require a significant expansion of arable land globally. Brazil is positioned to supply approximately 40% of that incremental demand, potentially growing agricultural exports from around USD 144 billion today to approximately USD 500 billion by 2050 – a roughly 3.5x increase. This growth rests not on land abundance alone, but on decades of scientific innovation in tropical agriculture, precision technology adoption, and bioinput development.

The global energy transition provides a second tailwind. Brazil already generates approximately 90% of its electricity from renewable sources. Its competitive position in biofuels – where it ranks among the world's top two producers – positions it to supply up to 30% of projected global biofuel demand by 2050, potentially reaching a domestic industry approaching USD 200 billion in revenues. Simultaneously, Brazil's renewable energy base makes it an increasingly attractive location for energy-intensive digital infrastructure.

Brazil's critical minerals position represents a third and increasingly strategic advantage. The country holds approximately 95% of global niobium reserves, 25% of graphite, and 23% of rare earths – making it the second-largest holder of critical mineral reserves globally, behind only China. Total mineral exports could rise four- to sixfold by 2050.

The fourth megatrend – the shift of economic power to emerging markets – positions Brazil's large, digitally sophisticated consumer market for fourfold growth in discretionary spending per capita under the aspirational scenario.

A question of national ambition

The full implications of the aspirational case extend beyond macroeconomic indicators. Infant mortality could fall by half. Life expectancy could rise by five years. Brazil's Human Development Index score could reach 0.90 – the highest in Latin America. These outcomes are not the byproducts of favorable conditions. They are the result of a deliberate, sustained choice to implement reforms that are well understood but have too often been deferred.

Brazil already possesses the structural foundations that other nations have lacked when attempting this transition. The question our study poses is whether the country will choose to activate them – and what it will cost future generations if it does not.

At 4% annual growth, Brazil's GDP could reach USD 6 trillion by 2050 – double the base case – lifting it to 5th place globally.